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[L. A. No. 29354. In Bank. Apr. 19, 1967.] 
P. S. 0 'REILLY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD OF 
MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA, Defendant and Respondent. 
[la, Ib] Oonstitutional Law-Due Process--Pursuance of Occupa-
tion: Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses--
Review.-Assessment by the state medical board of a penalty 
for a doctor's unprofessional conduct on the basis of pro-
ceedings initiated before the osteopathic board was not a 
denial of due process where, after the doctor elected to cease 
being licensed by the osteopathic board and to become licensed 
by the medical board, the matter was transferred to the 
medical board and it ratified prior actions of the osteopathic 
board, which fully complied with the required procedures in 
Gov. Code, §§ 11503, 11505, 11509. 
[2] IeL-Due Process of Law.-Due process is not interested in 
mere technical formalism; substance determines whether due 
process was afforded. 
[3] Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Statu-
tory Provisions.-A state law incompatible with federal law 
cannot be enforced, and in determining the right of the state 
medical board to discipline a doctor for employment of doctors 
unlicensed in this state to treat the sick pursuant to the fed-
eral exchange-visitor program (62 Stat. 6), the controlling 
question is whether Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2392, making it un-
professional conduct to employ an unlicensed practitioner to 
treat the sick, is incompatible with the federal program. 
MeK. Dig. References: [1] Constitutional Law, §176; Phy-
sicians and Surgeons, § 30; [2] Constitutional Law, § 169 (1); [3] 
Physicians and Surgeons, § 17; [4] Physicians and Surgeons, 
§ 4(1); [5] Physicians and Surgeons, § 28(4); [6, 7] Physicians 
and Surgeons, § 30. 
) 
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Id.-Statutes and Regulations-Validity.-Though to comply 
with state Jaw, a foreign visitor must either refrain from 
practicing medicine or comply with burdensome state regula-
tions, the federal statute establishing the exchange-visitor pro-
gram (62 Sbt. 6, now repeaJed and consolidated with other 
programs under 22 U.S.C. § 2451 et seq.) does not supersede 
state regulations; the federal program does not provide effec-
tive patient protection, and since Congress has the power to 
regulate the practice of medicine, even though the power is 
ordinarily committed to the states, it cannot be assumed that 
in establishing the exchange program, Congress intended to 
deprive patients of the protection of state regulation. 
Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Evidence.-In a 
disciplinary proceeding concerning a doctor's alleged employ-
ment of an unlicensed practitioner to treat the sick in violation 
of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2392, a conclusion that an unlicensed 
doctor had diagnosed and treated a patient and had been 
empioyed to do so was justified by evidence that the unlicensed 
doctor performed medical functions and administered treat-
ments to the patient and that the ac~used, who had employed 
the unlicensed doctor pursuant to the federal exchange pro-
gram, had never seen the patient; consultations with the--
accused did not make the unlicensed doctor's action lawful. 
Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Review.-In a 
p~o~eeding to discipline a doctor for a violation of Bus. & 
Prof. Code, § 2392, making it unprofessional conduct to employ 
an unlicensed practitioner to treat the sick, though good faith 
is not a defense, any punishment greater than probation was 
precluded for a violation of § 2392 by the violator's apparent 
good faith in allowing foreign .doctors to assist him pursuant 
to the federal exchange-visitor program and by the uncertainty 
surrounding the question of federal pre-emption of state regu-
lations. 
Id.-Suspension and Revocation of License-Review.-Where 
a single penalty was imposed for two violations of Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 2392, by a doctor's employment of unlicensed practi-
tioners to care for the sick and it did not appear on appeal 
to what extent the medical board had relied on one violation 
for which the imposed penalty was too severe, the case must 
be remanded to the board for reconsideration of the penalty 
assessed. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. William E. MacFaden, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Physicians and Surgeons, § 36; Am.Jur., 
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Proceeding in mandamus to set aside an order suspending a 
physician's license. JudgInent denying writ reversed with 
directions. 
Kirtland & Packard, Richard L. Kirtland, Walter N. Ander-
son and Ellis J. Horvitz for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
Stephen H. Silver and Conrad Lee Klein, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff P. S. O'Reilly appeals from a 
judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate to set 
aside an order of the Board of Medical Examiners. 
On September 12, 1962, an accusation was filed with the 
Board of Osteopathic Examiners charging plaintiff with two 
violations of Business and Professions Code section 2392.1 A 
hearing officer from the Office of Administrative Procedure 
held hearings on October 10 and December 20, 1962, and on 
March 11, 1963, filed a proposed decision finding cause for 
disciplinary action under section 2392. He recommended that 
plaintiff's license be revoked but that execution be stayed on 
the condition that plaintiff be placed on probation for five 
years and suspended from practice for 90 days. While the 
proceeding was pending plaintiff elected to become a licentiate 
of the Board of Medical Examiners (see Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 2396) and that board renewed his physician's and sur-
geon's certificate on January 18, 1963. Thereafter, on Jan-
uary 22, 1964, tIle Board of Medical Examiners ratified the 
proceedings before the Board of Osteopathic Examiners and 
adopted the decision of the hearing officer. 
Plaintiff then sought review of the board's order in the 
superior court. The court found that the proceedings of the 
medical board were within its jurisdiction, that the board's 
decision was supported by its findings, that the findings were 
supported by the weight of competent evidence, and that the 
penalty imposed was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, 
it denied relief. 
lSection 2392 provides: "The employing, directly or indirectly, of any 
suspended or unlicensed practitioner in the practice of any system or 
mode of treating the sick or afflicted or the aiding or abetting of any 
unlicensed person to practice any system or mode of treating the sick or 
aftlicted constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this 
chapter." All further statutory citations are to the Business and Profes-
sions Code unless otherwise specified. 
I 
I 
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[1a] We note at the outset that there is no merit in plain-
tiff's contention that he was denied due process when the 
medical board assessed the penalty against him on the basis of 
proceedings initiated before the osteopathic board. The matter 
was transferred to the Board of Medical Examiners after 
plaintiff had elected to cease being licensed by the osteopathic 
board and to become a licentiate of the medical board. 
[2] "[D] ue process is not interested in mere technical 
formalism. It is the substance that is determinative of whether 
due process has been afforded." (Cooper v. State Board 01 
Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242, 245 [217 P.2d 630, 18 
A.L.R.2d 593].) [1b] The medical board ratified the prior 
actions of the osteopathic board, which complied fully with 
the procedures set forth in Government Code sections 11503, 
11505 and 11509.2 Plaintiff was not injured by the transfer. 
To refile the accusation would have been an idle act, and to 
require the hearing officer to rehear the case would have been 
needlessly wasteful. . 
The first charge of unprofessional conduct concerned plain-
tiff's employment of Dr. Daniel Sanchez and Dr. Morimitsu 
Ohnishi, who were not licensed to practice medicine in Cali-
fornia. Dr. Sanchez is a citizen of Mexico and received his 
medical degree there. Dr. Ohnishi is a citizen of Japan, where 
he received his medical degree and is a professor of medicine. 
Both doctors came to the United States under an exchange-
visitor program, authorized by the United States Information-
and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, to serve as trainees in 
general and traumatic surgery. The Department of State had 
designated plaintiif's California Emergency Hospital as an 
exchange-visitor program to provide training in general and 
. traumatic surgery for qualified foreign medical students and 
had appointed plaintiif as the responsible officer of the pro-
gram. The parties stipulated that on August 21, 1959, plaintiff 
aided and abetted Dr. Ohnishi in giving anesthetics to a 
patient and aided and abetted Dr. Sanchez in assisting in sur-
gery upon the patient. From the foregoing facts the board 
concluded that plaintiif violated section 2392 by employing 
and aiding and abetting Dr. Ohnishi and Dr. Sanchez in the 
unlicensed practice of medicine. 
2Section 11503 requires the :filing of an accusation specifying the 
statutes that have been violated and the facts that constitute the viola-
tion. Section 11505 requires that the respondent be served with the ac-
cusation and be notified of his rights to a hearing. Section 11509 requires 
notice to the respondent of the time and place of the hearin". 
) 
) 
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Plaintiff contends that the board cannot discipline him for 
these activities, since they were undertaken pursuant to the 
federal exchange-visitor program. He asserts that the suprem-
acy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2) 
precludes enforcement of the state licensing laws in this case, 
on the ground that such enforcement would interfere with the 
federal exchange program. 'Ve do not agree with plaintiff's 
contention. 
[3] Since a state law that is incompatible with federal law 
cannot be enforced (United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-
232 [86 L.Ed. 796, 817-819, 62 8.Ct. 552]; United States v. 
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331-332 [81 L.Ed. 1134, 1139-1140, 57 
8.Ct. 758]), the controlling question is whether section 2392 is 
incompatible with the federal program. 
The exchange-visitor program was established by the United 
States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 
(62 Stat. 6).' Congress declared its purpose to be "to pro-
mote a better understanding of the United States in other 
countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the 
people of the United States and the people of other coun-
tries" by, among other things, establishing an interchange of 
persons, knowledge and skill. (See 62 Stat. 6, § 2.) The Secre-
tary of State was authorized to provide for the interchange 
between the United States and other countries of students, 
trainees, teachers, guest instructors, professors, and leaders in 
fields of specialized knowledge or skill. (See 62 Stat. 7, § 201.) 
The Secretary was directed to use "existing reputable agen-
cies, " preferably private rather than governmental, in set-
ting up the program for foreign visitors. (See 62 Stat. 7, 14, 
§§ 201, 1005.) In addition he was empowered to prescribe and 
enforce the conditions under which the foreign visitors were 
to be admitted to this country. (See 62 Stat. 7, § 201.) 
Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Secretary es-
tablished different classes of exchange-visitor programs, in-
cluding programs sponsored by hospitals and related institu-
tions. (See 22 C.F.R. § 63.3 (c) (1).) Under the regulations 
those who wish to sponsor a program must apply to the Secre-
tary for approval, and in reviewing the application the Secre-
tary considers professional organizations' appraisal of the 
quality of a particular program. (See 22 C.F.R. §§ 63.2(a), 
8This statute was repealed by Public Law 87-256, § 111 (a) (2), 75 
Stat. 538 (1961) and the program was consolidated with other similar 
programs by Public Law 87-256, 75 Stat. 527-38 (1961), 22 U.S.C. 
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63.3(a).) The Secretary also can revoke the approval for suffi-
cient cause including failure to maintain educational stand-
ards established by competent professional agencies. (See 22 
C.F.R. § 63.3 (b).) Once approved, the sponsor has the pri-
mary responsibility for recruiting exchange visitors and must 
provide them with a form specifying the purpose, direction 
and condition of the visit. (See 22 C.F.R. § 63.4.) This form 
enables the visitor to obtain his visa from the American consul 
in his native country. 
Dr. O'Reilly applied for approval as a sponsor of an ex-
change-visitor program and in support of his application filed 
letters from the American College of Osteopathic Surgeons 
and the American Osteopathic Association attesting to the 
nature and quality of his hospital program. The Secretary 
designated plaintiff as a sponsor of a program to provide 
training" in general and traumatic surgery for qualified for-
eign medical students and a three-year course in clinical 
laboratory for qualified foreign studentB. Thereafter, plaintiff 
recruited Drs. Ohnishi and Sanchez to participate in his pro-
gram as trainees in traumatic and reconstructive surgery with 
special emphasis in reconstruction of the hand and forearm. 
There can be no question that to conduct the exchange 
program in compliance with the state medical regula~ion 
would frustrate to some extent the program's foreign pol-
icy objectives. Effective practical training in general and 
traumatic surgery requires some treatment of patientB. (See 
§§ 2147, 2147.5, which authorize undergraduate and post-
graduate medical students to perform medical functions in 
the course of their study.) Such treatment would be permis-
sible if the foreign doctor were licensed in California (see 
§ 2193) or if the program were conducted under the auspices 
of an approved medical school in compliance with the detailed--
requirementB of sections 2147.5 and 2147.6. Either of these 
alternatives, however, would impose burdens on the foreign 
visitors that might be out of proportion to the benefits that 
they could expect to receive under the limited exchange pro-
grams contemplated under the federal statute. Either alterna-
tive would also expose the foreign visitor to rejection by the 
state board for various reasons. [4] Although it thus ap-
pears that to comply with state law a foreign visitor must 
either refrain from practicing medicine or comply with bur-
densome state regulations, we do not believe that the federal 
statute supersedes state regulation. 
The basic problem is one of accommodating the foreign pol:-
I 
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icy objectives of the exchange programs with the interests of 
the patients who might be treated by the visiting doctors. 
Congress has the power to make this accommodation even 
though the power to regulate the practice of medicine is ordi-
narily committed to the states. (Linder v. United States, 268 
U.S. 5, 18 [69 L.Ed. 819, 823,45 8.Ct. 446, 39 A.L.R. 229] ; cf. 
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 385' [10 L.Ed.2d 428, 432, 
433, 83 8.Ct. 1322].) It cannot be lightly assumed, however, 
that in establishing the exchange program, Congress intended 
to deprive patients of the protection of state regulation. Had 
it so intended, we are convinced that it would have provided 
an effective alternative to protect patients of visiting doctors. 
The federal program does not provide effective patient protec-
tion. A prospective sponsor need only secure summary recom-
mendation from professional groups (see 22 C.F.R. § 633 
(a)), and the selection of the visitors is controlled largely by 
the sponsors, not the federal authorities. Finally we note that 
our conclusion that state regulation is not superseded is sup-
ported by the only administrative interpretation we have been 
able to find." 
Plaintiff also contends that under state law the federal en-
actment is a statutory basis for an implied exception to the 
state regulations pursuant to which the visitors could lawfully 
perform medical acts. He invokes Magit v. Board of Medical 
Examiners, 57 Ca1.2d 74 [17 Cal.Rptr. 488, 366 P.2d 816], in 
which we recognized that with a statutory basis for an excep·· 
tion, persons not licensed to practice medicine may perform 
some medical acts. The reasoning of the Magit case, however, 
was based on the interrelationship of the state licensing pro-
visions applicable to doctors and nurses, and there is nothin~ 
in that case or in the legislative scheme to support an excep-
tion to the prohibition of unlicensed practice based on a fed-
eral rather than a state statute. 
411 In approving any partieular exehange program, I assume, as the 
responsible offieer of the Department of State, that the sponsor will be 
aware of and eomply with the applieable federal, state and loeal laws." 
(Letter from Culver E. Gidden, Chief, Faeilitative Serviees Staff, Bureau 
of Edueational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, to Warren H. 
Deering, Deputy Attorney General, Deeember 11, 1964.) Plaintiff con-
tends that the word " applicable" in this letter begs the basic question, 
namely, what laws are applieable' Since the letter was written in response 
to an inquiry from the Attorney General about the applieability of state 
law to plaintiff's exchange program, we doubt that Mr. Gidden meant to 
avoid the inquiry by begging the question. We believe he meant that 
federal, state, and loeal laws that would ordinarily apply remained ap-
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The second charge of unprofessional conduct involves plain-
tiff's employment of 'Villiam Thomas Duffy, who was a grad-
uate of the California College of Medicine but was not li-
censed to practice medicine in California. Mrs. Beatric(' 
Gowdy te~tified that Duffy diagnosed an injury to her knee 
and treated it on several occasions at plaintiff's hospital. On 
no occasion had plaintiff examined her or been present while 
she was being treated. Plaintiff testified, however, that he 
had examined Mrs. Gowdy on several of her visits and had 
made the diagnosis and that Duffy had consulted him before 
administering each treatment. 
The board found that plaintiff employed Duffy and that 
Duffy practiced "a system of treatment in the diagnosis and 
treating. of one Beatrice Gowdy." It further found that 
Duffy consulted with plaintiff before applying diathermy and 
other treatment and that plaintiff was not present during the 
treatments. 
[5] Plaintiff contends that the evidence and findings do 
not support the conclusion that he employed Duffy to practice 
medicine. There is, however, substantial evidence to the con-
trary. In administering the treatments to Mrs. Gowdy, Duffy 
performed medical functions and his consultations with plain-
tiff did not make his actions lawfuI. Although section 2665, 
subdivision (a), allows! a full time assistant to adminis~er 
physical therapy under' a licensed person's "orders, direc-
tions and supervision," there is no evidence that plaintiff 
attempted to provide the supervision required by this section. 
In addition, Mrs. Gowdy testified that plaintiff had never seen 
her. These facts justify the conclusion that Duffy had diag-
nosed and treated Mrs. Gowdy and that he was employed to 
do so. 
Finally, plaintiff contends that even if the charges are sus-
tained by the evidence, the punishment is excessive. [6] Al-
though good faith is not a defense (see Magif v. Board 01 
Medical Examiners, supra, 57 Ca1.2d 74), we believe that the 
uncertainty surrounding the question of federal pre-emption 
and plaintiff's apparent good faith in allowing the foreign 
doctors to assist him preclude any punishment greater than 
probation for the violation involving the exchange program. 
(See Magit v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra; Harrisv;---
Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 62 Ca1.2d 589, 594-595 
r 43 Cal.Rptr. 633, 400 P.2d 745] ; Brown v. Gordon, 240 Cal. 
App.2d 659, 666~667 [49 Cal. Rptr. 901]; cf. Hildebrand v. 
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[7] Since a single penalty was imposed for both violations 
we have no way of knowing the extent to which the board 
relied upon the first violation in imposing the 90-day suspen-
sion. Accordingly, the case must be remanded to the board for 
reconsideration of the penalty assessed. (See Cooper v. State 
Board of Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242, 252 [217 P.2d 
630, 18 A.L.R.2d 593]; Garfield v. Board of Medical Exam-
iners, 99 Cal.App.2d 219, 231-232 [221 P.2d 705].) 
The judgment is reversed, and the trial court is directed to 
enter judgment ordering respondent board to set aside its 
order of revocation and to reconsider the penalty in the light 
of this opinion. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., Sullivan, J., and White, 
J.,. concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would affirm the judgment for 
the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Kingsley in the opinion 
prepared by him for the Court of Appeal in O'Reilly v. 
Board of Med1:cal Examiners (Cal.App.) 55 Ca1.Rptr. 152. 
i 
Appellant's petition for a rellearing was denied May 17, 
1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself 
disqualified. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicia] Council. 
